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In 1934, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") and provided it with a simple yet com-
pelling mandate: "[T]o make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reason-
able charges."' The Commission's regulations were to be guided by
"public convenience, interest, or necessity."' The capability of com-
munications technology was virtually unlimited and largely unknown.
However, nearly 600 radio stations were interfering with each others'
signals, the broadcast spectrum was in chaos, and the public was not being
J.D., Stanford Law School; A.B., Stanford University. Associate Professor of Law
and Faculty Advisor to the Federal Communications Law Journal Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington; Senior Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Program in
Communications Policy Studies; Of Counsel, Fields & Director, P.C. The author gratefully
acknowledges the generous assistance of Beth Cate, Bruce Markell, Gina Viola, and
Yvonne Zecca. This Article is the third in a series examining communications
policymaking; earlier versions of portions of this Article have appeared in Fred H. Cate,
Communications Policy Making, Competition and the Public Interest: The New Dialogue,
68 IND. L.J. 665 (1993); and Fred H. Cate, Global Information Policymaking and
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Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 1, 48 Stat. 562 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
2 47 U.S.C. § 303, 307(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see id. § 309.
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served.3 Broadcasters themselves sought federal action. In fact, at the Third
National Radio Conference in 1924, then Secretary of Commerce Hoover
commented: "I think this is probably the only industry of the United
States that is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated." ' 4 After a
decade of resistance, Congress stepped in and required that the radio
frequency spectrum be regulated as a scarce public resource to serve the
public interest.5
Sixty years later, Congress and the plethora of other federal com-
munications industry regulators-including, among others, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration in the Department of
Commerce, the Bureau of International Communications in the State
Department, and the Commission-face far greater regulatory challenges
presented by dramatically advancing technologies and an information-
dependent, global marketplace. Among these challenges, five interrelated
features of the modern economic and political environment present both
opportunities and potential obstacles for communications policy: (1) the
growing importance of information, not merely communications; (2) the
inherently global characteristics of information; (3) the centrality of
information to business and government activities, including those of non-
traditional communications companies; (4) the importance of protecting
privacy and of assuring accuracy, security, and reliability of information;
and (5) the need to revise intellectual property law to take account of
digital technologies and multinational issues.
Communications policymakers need to recognize the existence and
importance of these five elements and to address them explicitly if future
communications policies are to be effective and meaningful. In addition,
these five dynamic features necessitate that policymakers re-examine the
meaning and application of the longstanding touchstone of communications
policy-"public interest"-and the constitutionality of pursuing the
"public interest" in a multichannel, multitechnology, multinational
market.
II. COMMUNICATIONS POLICYMAKING TODAY
Communications and related industries are among the fastest growing,
most profitable segments of the United States economy.6 In 1991, for
ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 11 (3d ed.
1982).
4 SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND
RADIO 126 (3d ed. 1976).
' See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
6 Cate, Communications Policy Making, supra note *, at 665; see also Anne W.
Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data Flow
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example, Walt Disney replaced steel behemoth USX in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and oil giant Mobil Corporation in Amex's Major
Market Index.7 While domestic automotive, textile, and manufacturing
industries fall victim to lower priced and often higher quality imports, the
business of creating and delivering entertainment and information program-
ming is second only to defense in its positive contribution to the U.S. trade
balance.8 Yet U.S. policymaking in this important sector has often become,
in the words of Stuart Brotman, now Chair of the American Bar Associa-
tion Section of International Law and Practice Communications Com-
mittee, an "endless policy loop."9
Consider cable television. The FCC has pursued an unbelievable array
of conflicting and contradictory policies with regard to cable. At first the
in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 989 (1983) (discussing the growth and indis-
pensability of information services).
7 Patrick Harverson, Disney 's Dow Debut No Cartoon Fantasy, FIN. TIMES, May .4,
1991, § I, at 24; Walt Disney's Stock to Replace Mobil in Amex s Major Market Index,
SEC. WK., Dec. 23, 1991, at 7. USX was formerly Andrew Carnegie's U.S. Steel, the
nation's first billion dollar company. Gerald Parkinson, Steelmaking Renaissance:
Technology is Revitalizing the Steelmaking Industry, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, May 1991,
at 31.
8 Fred H. Cate, The European Broadcasting Directive, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. &
PRAC. COMM. COMMITTEE MONOGRAPH SERIES 7 (Apr. 1990). Exports of U.S. television
programming and films alone returned over $2.5 billion to the United States during 1988.
Id. The "information and communication" sector accounts for 9.2% of the U.S. Gross
Domestic Product, while the historically important construction industry accounts for only
7.2%. Patrick Bloomfield, "New "Economy Beckons Investors, FIN. POST, Mar. 3, 1992,
§ 2, at 18.
Information is similarly important in the European economy. Estimates published in
the Financial Times in 1992 indicate that telecommunications alone will account for 6%
of the European Economic Community's Gross Domestic Product by the turn of the
century and that more than half of all EC jobs already "depend on information and
communication technology." Hilary Clarke, Total Deregulation is still a long way off:
Resistance in Europe, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, § Ill.
9 A typical policy path involves outside parties presenting adversarial arguments to the
FCC in either trial-type or notice-and-comment proceedings. The staff resources and time
required to complete such a proceeding, accompanied by the likelihood of an even more
time-consuming judicial appeal, frequently represent a formidable barrier to meaningful
policy formulation under either type of proceeding.
The result, all too often, is a chain of decision-appeal-reversal-remand-decision; a
process that can be characterized as an endless policy loop. Stuart N. Brotman, The
Curious Case of the Must-Carry Rules: Breaking the Endless Policy Loop Through
Negotiated Rulemaking, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 405 (1988). See generally Cate,
Communications Policy Making, supra note *,* at 666-69 (giving illustrations of the
"endless policy loop").
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Commission eschewed jurisdiction over cable."° In 1965, the FCC
promulgated must-carry and nonduplication rules for cable signals
transmitted by microwave,1" which it extended to all cable systems in
1966.2 The Commission also required new cable operators in the top 100
markets to obtain a waiver in order to import distant signals, 3 but it rarely
issued those waivers, 4 and in 1972 modified, 5 and then in 1980 virtually
eliminated, 6 distant signal carriage rules. In 1968, the Commission
recommended retransmission consent as a condition of distant signal
carriage,1 7 but Congress refused to adopt it, and in 1971 the Commission
abandoned the concept.' 8 In 1970, the FCC considered allowing cable
operators in the top 100 markets to import four distant signals from
independent broadcasters,' 9 but then rejected this approach the following
year.20 In 1972, the Commission enacted syndicated exclusivity, modified
distant signal carriage, and "anti-leapfrogging" rules.2' The FCC
'o Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations,
and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C.
403, 426-31 (1959) (report and order).
Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (first report and order)
(subsequent to the institution of proceedings, Part 11 was redesignated Part 91). The rules
required cable operators "upon request, to carry the signals of all local television stations,
without material degradation in quality, and to refrain from duplicating the programs of
local commercial stations, either simultaneously or within 15 days before or after local
broadcast." Id. at 683.
2 Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 746 (1966) (second report and
order).
I3 d. at 781-88.
Leslie A. Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6
COMM/ENT 283, 288 (1983).
'" Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (report and order).
16 Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980)
(report and order), aff'd sub nom. Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
" Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 15 F.C.C.2d 417,432 (1968) (notice of proposed
rulemaking and inquiry).
"8 Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 117
(1971) (letter from FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee).
'9 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 24 F.C.C.2d 580, 582 (1970) (second further
notice of proposed rulemaking).
20 Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d at 117.
2' Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 165-68 (1972) (report and
order). The syndicated exclusivity rules prohibited cable systems in large markets from
carrying distant signals containing programs to which a local station had acquired
exclusive local rights. See id. The anti-leapfrogging rules required a cable operator
who wished to import distant signals to choose those that originated nearest to operator.
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eliminated the anti-leapfrogging rules in 197522 and repealed its syndicated
exclusivity and distant signal carriage rules in 1980.23
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the
Commission's must-carry rules in 1985.24 The FCC responded to intense
Congressional and broadcast industry pressure and promulgated revised
must-carry rules, which the court struck down in 1987.25 The following
year, the FCC reimposed syndicated exclusivity rules.26 It is little wonder
that the Court of Appeals, upholding those rules, referred to "the
checkered history of the regulation of cable television by the Federal
Communications Commission.' '27 Henry Geller, former General Counsel
of the Commission, has written that the "FCC's main contribution to
cable TV's development was inadvertent. 28
In 1992, the battle over cable returned to Congress. After three years
of unsuccessfully trying to pass a cable bill, the House and Senate finally
agreed on a bill. 29 The accomplishment of more than three years of
unremitting legislative activity: Congress kicked the toughest issue-rate
regulation-back to the FCC to determine what constitutes "unreason-
able" rates.3° The law also requires cable conglomerates to sell their
programming to competing services, 31 a notable policy reversal from the
FCC's 1969 rule requiring cable companies to generate original
programming. 32 The third significant provision of the bill-retransmission
22 Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 645 (1975) (report and
order).
23 Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 664-65
(1980) (report and order).
24 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
25 Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). Still further revised rules were finally upheld by the court
in 1993. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 40 (D.D.C. 1993).
26 Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Program
Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 F.C.C.R. 5299, 5300 (1988) (report
and order).27 United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
28 Henry Geller, Communications Law-A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 73,
79 (1985). See generally Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright
License, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 195-202, 215-19 (1990) (tracing the history of the
FCC's regulation of the cable industry).
29 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West Supp.
1993)).
30 Id. § 532(c)(4)(A).
"' Id. § 533(f)(2).
32 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 208 (1969) (first report and
order).
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consent33-had been rejected by Congress and by the FCC in 1971 as
unworkable 34 and is directly contrary to the FCC's must-carry rules35 that
Congress was still pushing as recently as 1987.36 President Bush promptly
vetoed the bill,37 and Congress responded by handing the President the first
override of his administration.38
The FCC, under the first Democratic presidential administration in
twelve years, immediately set to work implementing the mandate to
reregulate cable that it had strongly resisted for the previous decade. In the
eighteen months since the bill became law, the Commission has issued
more than two dozen notices of inquiry and notices of proposed
rulemaking.39 In fact, with regard to the pressing issue of rate regulation,
33 47 U.S.C.A. § 548(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
31 Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115 (1971)
(letter from FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee).
3' Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (second report and order).
36 See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
37 138 CONG. REC. S16,666 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
38 138 CONG. REC. HI 1,477-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5,1992); 138 CONG. REC. S16,652-77
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
39 See, e.g., Implementation of Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Cable Home Wiring, 7 F.C.C.R. 7349 (1992) (notice of proposed
rulemaking); Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access
Channels, 7 F.C.C.R. 7709 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Broadcast Signal
Carriage Issues, 7 F.C.C.R. 8055 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Tier
Buy-Through Prohibitions, 7 F.C.C.R. 8672 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking);
Consumer Protection and Customer Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 8641 (1992) (notice of proposed
rulemaking); Rate Regulation, 8 F.C.C.R. 510 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking);
Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and
Carriage, 8 F.C.C.R. 194 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Horizontal and Vertical
Ownership Limits, Cross-Ownership Limitations and Anti-trafficking Provisions, 8
F.C.C.R. 210 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of inquiry); Equal
Employment Opportunities, 8 F.C.C.R. 266 (1993) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Home
Shopping Station Issues, 8 F.C.C.R. 660 (1993) (notice of proposed rulemaking);
Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, 8 F.C.C.R.
725 (1993) (notice of inquiry); Cable Home Wiring, 8 F.C.C.R. 1435 (1993) (report and
order); Inquiry into Sports Programming Migration, 8 F.C.C.R. 1492 (1993) (notice of
inquiry); Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Cross-Ownership Limitations and
Anti-trafficking Provisions, 8 F.C.C.R. 1696 (1993) (order); Direct Broadcast Satellite
Public Service Obligations, 8 F.C.C.R. 1589 (1993) (notice of proposed rulemaking);
Buy-Through Prohibition, 8 F.C.C.R. 2274 (1993) (report and order); Rate Regulation, 8
F.C.C.R. 2921 (1993) (order); Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on
Cable Access Channels, 8 F.C.C.R. 2638 (1993) (second report and order); Home
Shopping Station Issues, 8 F.C.C.R. 2656 (1993) (order); Development of Competition
and Diversity in Video. Programming Distribution and Carriage, 8 F.C.C.R. 3359 (1993)
(first report and order); Rate Regulation (12 parts), 8 F.C.C.R. 5631 (1993) (report and
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the Commission recently adopted its Second Order on Reconsideration,
Fourth Report and Order, and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 40 It
remains to be seen whether the cable and broadcast television industries,
much less the American public, will have gained anything in this most
recent regulatory round robin.
This endless policy loop presents far greater risks in the face of the
challenges posed by the very technologies that have driven the rapid
expansion of communications industries. Keeping up has proven difficult,
but just keeping up is not enough; our policymakers must get ahead of the
technology curve. As Stuart Brotman has noted, "action and not reaction
is needed in this area. '
41
If the Federal Government is going to undertake to develop and enforce
communications policies, then America's communications policymakers
and regulators-not to mention the industries themselves-must develop a
far broader perspective about the wide range of issues that affect, and are
affected by, those policies. That new perspective will be influenced by, and
must of necessity reflect, five interrelated features of communications in
the twenty-first century.
III. THE NEW POLICY
A. Information Policymaking
First, U.S. communications policymaking for the next century will be
dramatically influenced by, and will certainly reflect, a shift in focus from
communications to information, from conduit to content. Already,
beginning with the break-up of AT&T, federal regulators have begun to
expand dramatically the focus of "communications" policy from the
means by which information is delivered to the content and format of that
information itself. For example, today's telecommunications companies
order and further notice of proposed rulemaking); Rate Regulation (12 Parts), 58 Fed.
Reg. 33,560 (June 18, 1993) (order); Cost of Service, 58 Fed. Reg. 40,762 (July 30, 1993)
(notice of inquiry); Rate Regulation 8 F.C.C.R. 5585 (1993) (order and further notice of
proposed rulemaking); Rate Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,737 (Sept. 2, 1993) (report and
order and further notice of proposed rulemaking); Rate Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,141
(Nov. 15, 1993) (order); Rate Regulation, 8 F.C.C.R. 8444 (1993) (third report and order);
Rate Regulation, 59 Fed. Reg. 6901 (Feb. 8, 1994) (order); Rate Regulation, 1994 FCC
LEXIS 770 (Feb. 23, 1994) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
40 Implementation of Sections of Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, 1994 FCC LEXIS 770 (Feb. 23, 1994) (report
and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
"' Stuart N. Brotman, Executive Branch Communications Policymaking: Reconciling
Function and Form with the Council of Communications Advisers, 42 FED. COMM. L.J.
51, 52 (1989).
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digitally manipulate a wide variety of information ranging from voice to
computer traffic. This manipulation may change, or add value to, the
content--e.g., by providing information as to the identity of the caller or the
number from which she or he is calling.
In the past, regulators have sought to distinguish between "struc-
tural"-i.e., ownership-versus "behavioral"-i.e., indecency-regulations.42
While these distinctions have always been somewhat specious, they are
even less supportable in a multichannel, multitechnology marketplace.
Regulating the "structure" of broadcasters may have had some effect on
the ultimate product when the industry Consisted of three powerful net-
works, but it is ineffective and, in fact, counterproductive when viewers
can choose from video programming delivered by cable, over-the-air
broadcast television, video cassette or disc, or even floppy disk or dial-up
database.
As the telephone companies and mainframe computer giants have
discovered to their chagrin, the money is to be made in software, not
hardware, in storing and processing data, not merely transmission, in
information, not just communications. "Communications" policymakers
must recognize that reality and the challenges it poses to defining effective
regulation of a far more diverse information marketplace and to
determining whether such regulations will be constitutional or desirable.
These and other ramifications of the expansion from communications to
information are addressed in greater detail in the other four features
discussed below.
B. The Global Characteristics of Information
The new information policy must explicitly recognize that information
is inherently global-it respects no boundaries. Anne Branscomb, head of
the American Bar Association Science and Technology Section Project on
International Information Networks, has written: "The very existence of
information technology is threatening to nation states."43 According to
Professor Joseph N. Pelton:
We are not talking about a modest proposition here.
Telepower in its various forms-telecommunications, elec-
tronic entertainment, computer and information services,
42 See, e.g., DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA 157 (2d ed. 1991).
43 Branscomb, supra note 6, at 987-88. See generally Cate, Global Information
Policymaking, supra note * (discussing the global nature of information and the need for
countries to establish compatible legal regimes).
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robotics, artificial intelligence, and expert systems-is
already reshaping the global economy, internationalizing
labor, and shifting jobs in space, time, and concept. Some
would argue it is rendering the nation state obsolete.44
Whether in a wire or optical fiber, or beamed from a satellite or micro-
wave dish, information-particularly electronic information-is ubiquitous.
Unlike a truckload of steel or a freight train of coal, television and radio
signals, telephone, facsimile, and modem communications are difficult to
pinpoint and almost impossible to block, through either legal or
technological means. "[D]igital information flowing in cables or moving
through space will be, in effect, a single, homogenous stream .... [I]t will
become increasingly impossible to maintain any of the traditional dis-
tinctions between transmissions carrying news, entertainment, financial
data, or even personal phone calls. ' 45
As a result of its inherently pervasive, transnational character, in-
formation has been the subject of some of the earliest multinational
agreements, treaties, and organizations. Binational postal treaties were
concluded as early as 1601 between France and Spain and 1670 between
France and England.46 In 1874, the Postal Congress of Berne established
a multinational postal regime-administered today by the Universal Postal
Union ("UPU")-74 years before the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") was opened for signature. 7 This global framework is
so comprehensive, and the practical difficulty of separating domestic and
international mail so great, that UPU regulations today set the terms for
domestic, as well as international, service.48
Electronically transmitted information also sparked multinational
agreements almost immediately upon its commercial deployment. The
telegraph was first employed commercially in the early 1840s, and by
1849, bilateral and multinational agreements were in place to facilitate and
regulate its transnational use. 49 In 1865, Napoleon III called an interna-
44 Joseph N. Pelton, The Globalization of Universal Telecommunications Services, in
INSTITUTE FOR INFO. STUDIES, UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE: READY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY? 141, 143 (1991) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE].
45 W. Sparks, Address at the Annenberg School of Communication Conference on
World Communications (May 1980), quoted in Branscomb, supra note 6, at 1006.
46 Ludwig Weber, Postal Communications, International Regulation, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1983).
41 Id. at 238-39; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Jan.
1, 1948, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
48 Weber, supra note 46, at 241.
49 Alfons Noll, International Telecommunication Union, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1983); Peter Malanczuk, Telecommunications, International
Regulation, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (1986).
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tional conference in Paris to address technical standards, codes, and tariffs
for the telegraph.5 ° The twenty countries attending negotiated the first
International Telegraph Union, which later combined with the Radiotele-
graph Conference to form the International Telecommunications Union
("ITU").5" In short, by the time the telephone appeared on the scene in
1876, there already existed an eleven-year-old structure for dealing with
multinational electronic communication.
The United States, however, has not acted consistently in concert with
its trading partners with regard to information policy. While the United
States Government has been an active participant and, in many cases, a
leader in intergovernmental agencies dealing with technical aspects of
information and communication-such as spectrum allocation-it has often
resisted participation in multinational policy-level agreements.
U.S. communications laws and policies might be best described as
schizophrenic. The inherently global characteristics of information and its
economic importance magnify the importance of U.S. participation in
global information policymaking and institutions. Yet these same
characteristics are increasingly perceived as threats to U.S. leadership in
the information economy, heightening U.S. concern over protecting that
dominance. James Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security,
Assistance, Science, and Technology during the Reagan Administration,
testified in 1982 about the United States' concern about UNESCO
commission's report on the New World Information Order. "For the Un-
ited States," Secretary Buckley said, "communications and information
technologies represent a leading edge of U.S. strength. Policy and practice
in international communications and information activities must actively
enhance the overall well-being of the United States, the lives of its people,
and its system of government."'52
U.S. communications industries and policymakers have not lost sight
of the fact that one important tool for maintaining that "leading edge"
is trade law.53 The United States has applied a variety of trade stat-
utes-including the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988, 54 the
'o T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 38 (2d
ed. 1989).
51 Id.
52 James L. Buckley, International Communications and Information Objectives,
DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1982, at 79.
" See generally Fred H. Cate, United States Laws Regulating International
Telecommunications Products and Services, in FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR ASS'N,
1993 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE HANDBOOK (forthcoming) (discussing
trade protection measures available under United States trade laws).
" U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041,
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3002, and Pub. L. No. 100-418,
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Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 55 the Export Administration Act
of 1979,56 and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 197657 -to information services and products.
The broad language of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 198858 has been invoked against nations or groups
§ 1301 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). See generally Steven R. Phillips, The New
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open
Markets?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491 (1989) (detailing the history of the Act and
the changes which occurred in Unites States trade policy following its enactment); Brian
L. Ross, 'I Love Lucy, "But the European Community Doesn 't: Apparent Protectionism
in the European Community s Broadcast Market, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529 (1990)
(describing the Act as an effective means by which the Unites States can seek to eliminate
any unfair trade practices of foreign nations).
55 Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1217,
§§,1371-1382 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (1988)).
56 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (extended by
Export Administration Authorization for Fiscal Year 1993-94, Pub. L. No. 103-10, 107
Stat. 40 (1993)) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2419 (Supp. III 1991)). The Act
authorizes export controls
(1) [t]o protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials
and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand; (2) [t]o further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its international
responsibilities; and (3) [t]o exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the
standpoint of their significance to the national security of the United States.
15 C.F.R. § 770.1(a) (1993). The Act is administered by the Bureau of Export
Administration in the Department of Commerce, according to the Export Administration
Regulations. Id. § 768.1 (1993). Under the regulations, exporters must determine in which
of a complicated series of classification categories the products to be exported fit, and
then comply with the licensing requirements or restrictions applicable to that category.
The regulations are very broad; the range of "commodities" covered, for example,
includes "technical data." Id. § 770.2. Although the original Act has expired, its
provisions have been extended temporarily by the Export Administration Authorization
for Fiscal Year 1993-94, Pub. L. No. 103-10, 107 Stat. 40 (1993), pending complete
revision by Congress. See generally Branscomb, supra note 6.
57 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The
Act is administered by the Department of State under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (1993). The regulations require the maintenance of a
list-the United States Munitions List-containing "defense articles" and "defense
services," the export and import of which are restricted or prohibited. Id. § 121.1.
Exports or imports of communications products, including technical data, with potential
military applications are likely to require a license from the State Department's Office of
Munitions Control.
51 Under § 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, action by the President
or the U.S. Trade Representative is required whenever the Trade Representative
determines that
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of nations discriminating against U.S. telecommunications products or
services. For example, the Bush Administration threatened action against
the European Economic Community ("EC") if it sought to enforce its
controversial EC Council Directive Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities,59 which, in part, calls on member states to ensure
that a majority of broadcast programming is of European origin. 60 Bush
Administration Trade Representative Carla Hills took the first step toward
beginning a Section 301 investigation on April 26, 1991, when she placed
the EC on a Section 301 "priority watch list" because of the Broadcast-
ing Directive.6' If the EC subsequently is designated a "priority foreign
country," the Trade Representative then has thirty days to begin formal
negotiations designed to remedy the trade grievance and six months to
determine whether retaliatory action is necessary.62 In placing the EC on
the so-called "watch list"-a largely symbolic measure since the
designation invokes no statutory authority or time limits-the Trade
Representative noted that the EC had met some, but not all, of the criteria
for priority designation.63
the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being denied; ...
an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country . . . violates, or is inconsistent
with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,
any trade agreement, or ... is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce ....
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(1) (1988)). If the Trade
Representative makes such a determination, she or he is required to take all "appropriate
and feasible action ... to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice,"
including, but not limited to, action to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of,
benefits of trade agreement concessions; ... impose duties or other import restrictions on
the goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the
services of, such foreign country; . . . enter into binding agreements with such foreign
country . . . ." Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1), (c)(1)
(1988)).
" Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23 [hereinafter Broadcasting Directive].
See generally Fred H. Cate, The Continuing Battle Over the EC Broadcasting Directive,
1991 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. COMM. COMMITTEE MONOGRAPH SERIES (Nov. 1991);
Cate, The European Broadcasting Directive, supra note 8.
60 The Broadcasting Directive requires member states to ensure that "where
practicable and by appropriate means," a majority of broadcast transmission time,
excluding time occupied by news, sports, games, advertising, and teletext, is reserved for
"European works." Broadcasting Directive, supra note 59, art. 4.61 USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand Most Egregious Violators Under
Special 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (May 1, 1991).
62 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
63 USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand Most Egregious Violators Under
Special 301, supra note 61, at 643.
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Section 1377 of the Telecommunications Trade Act of 198864 has
proven somewhat narrow as applied, because the United States currently
has telecommunications products or services agreements with only three
countries: Canada, Japan, and Korea.65 Nonetheless, it has prompted
changes in the behavior of at least one of those countries. Korea responded
recently to the threat of trade sanctions, following the U.S. Trade
Representative's report that Korea had not abided by a 1992 agreement to
institute a "completely transparent and nondiscriminatory" procurement
system for Korea Telecom, by making public all procurement regulations
and assuring the U.S. Government that no other regulations were in force.66
Only one year earlier, the United States had threatened sanctions against
Japan for failing to comply with its telecommunications agreements.67
U.S. retaliatory trade sanctions against the EC are once again on the
table in response to the 1990 Council Directive on the Procurement
Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and
Telecommunications Sectors,68 which requires European telecommuni-
cations companies to accept EC bids if they are not more than three
percent over non-EC bids.69 U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
announced on February 1, 1993, that the United States would retaliate by
barring European companies from bidding on federal utility and service
contracts beginning March 22, 1993.70 On April 21, 1993, Trade
Representative Kantor announced an agreement with Sir Leon Brittan, EC
Commissioner for External Affairs, covering all but the telecommunica-
tions sectors, but promised $25 million in trade sanctions against the EC
64 Under § 1377 of the Telecommunications Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative
must annually review the "operation and effectiveness" of "every ... trade agreement
regarding telecommunications products or services that is in force with respect to the
United States"; in each review, the Trade Representative must determine whether "any
act, policy, or practice" of the participating country or countries other than the United
States is "not in compliance with the terms of such agreement or ... otherwise denies,
within the context of the terms of such agreement, to telecommunications products and
services of United States firms mutually advantageous market opportunities in that foreign
country." Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1377, 102 Stat. 1217, (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3106
(1988)).
65 Korea Publishes Phone Regulations Following U.S. Retaliation Threat, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 574 (Apr. 7, 1993).
66 id.
67 U.S. Delays Retaliation Against Japan Over Telecommunications Pending Talks, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 3, 1991).
68 Council Directive 90/531, 1990 O.J. (L297) 1.
69 Id. art. 29.
7 Keith Bradsher, U.S. Fights a European Trade Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at
D6; John M. Broder & Joel Havemann, U.S. Puts New Barriers on European Business,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at Al.
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unless the dispute over telecommunications equipment procurement was
resolved.7 Similarly, the Clinton Administration's celebration over the
successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations
was marred only by the fact that the United States had failed to reach
agreement with the EC over audiovisual services which were omitted from
the final agreement.7 2 Trade Representative Kantor warned ominously that
Section 301 and other U.S. trade laws remained viable tools for dealing
with trade disputes unilaterally.73 Congress' apparent approval of trade
sanctions as a negotiating tool was signalled by Representative Edward J.
Markey (D-Mass.), Chair of the House Commerce Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, who endorsed the Trade Representa-
tive's decision to go ahead with sanctions: "By imposing sanctions, the
United States is levelling the negotiating field."74
U.S. lawmakers and policymakers face an urgent challenge to recognize
that there is something different about information. The power, scope, and
reach of information, as well as its inherently global nature, raise the
stakes of going it alone. The long-term price of information trade barriers,
sanctions, and information-related laws that are incompatible with those of
other nations exceeds any short-term benefits resulting from such
protectionist policies. The new information policy must recognize the
importance of information in multinational trade while removing it from
the vagaries of trade rhetoric and tit-for-tat trade sanctions.
C. Non-Traditional Information Industries
The third reality which must be reflected by the new information
policy is that efficient, rapid, reliable communications are essential to the
operation of the Government and national and multinational businesses.
Anne Branscomb writes: "Information is the lifeblood that sustains
political, social, and business decisions. . . . Transborder data flow has
become indispensable to the very existence of transnational enterprise and
to the currently flourishing global marketplace."75 This significance of
information was forcefully recognized in the Clinton Administration's
recent National Information Infrastructure Agenda for Action:
7 Ana Puga, US to Slap EC With Trade Sanctions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1993, at
45; Last-minute Deal Cools Trade Dispute With EC, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1993, at NI.
72 See USTR Kantor Says Section 301 Not Affected by GATT Accord, 1993 Daily
Report for Executives (BNA) A-7 (Dec. 21, 1993).
73 id.
74 Peter Behr, U.S., Europe Reach Partial Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1993, at
BII.
75 Branscomb, supra note 6, at 987, 989.
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Information is one of the nation's most critical
economic resources . . . .By one estimate, two-thirds of
U.S. workers are in information-related jobs, and the rest
are in industries that rely heavily on information. In an era
of global markets and global competition, the technologies
to create, manipulate, manage and use information are of
strategic importance for the United States.76
Business Week reported as early as 1988 that corporations, are "racing
to expand their private [telecommunications] networks. ' 77 Westinghouse,
Digital Equipment, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard Toyota, IBM, and
hundreds of other multinational corporations are investing heavily in global
information systems.78 During the 1980s, for example, U.S. business alone
invested $1 trillion in information technology.7 9 According to Merrill
Lynch's vice-president for information and telecommunications: "This is
becoming a worldwide trading environment. Instantaneous communications
is [sic] vital."8 The business of managing and transporting information
was estimated in 1988 to generate $560 billion in revenue in 1991.8 Some
economists predict that new information services will ,create almost 1.5
million new jobs and add $110 billion to the Gross Domestic Product by
the end of the century.82
Consider, for example, the growing market for financial services-
banking, securities and commodities trading, letters of credit, currency
conversions, and loan guarantees. Approximately 5% of U.S. services
exports are in financial services;8 3 as of mid-1992, the United States held
66.3% of the world market for financial services, far ahead of the United
Kingdom with 17% and Japan with 5.1%.84 What is a global financial
system, in the words of Charles Goldfinger, but a "network of informa-
76 RONALD H. BROWN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 5 (1993).
77 John J. Keller et al., A Scramble for Global Networks, Bus. WK., Mar. 21, 1988, at
140.
78 See id. at 141-42.
79 Howard Gleckman et al., The Technology Payoff, Bus. WK., June 14, 1993, at 57,
58.
80 Keller, supra note 77, at 140 (quoting DeWayne J. Peterson).
8I Id. at 141.
82 RBOCs Still Anticipate Hatching Information Services'Golden Egg, TELEPHONE
NEWS, July 27, 1992, at 1.
83 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. BANKS AND
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4 (1992).
84 Peter Marsh, Financial Sector Wins 17% of Market, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at
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tion." 5 As a result, banks in the United States and elsewhere are investing
heavily in information technologies; Hong Kong's giant Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, for example, has a $1 billion information
technology budget.86
Information is equally significant for the activities of the Government.
Vice President Gore's Report of the National Performance Review notes
that the "[flailure to adapt to the information age threatens many aspects
of government. '"87 According to the report, $5.4 billion could be saved
over the next six years by "reengineering through information technol-
ogy."88 The report contains eleven recommendations for the improved use
of information technology, including the creation of a Government
Information Technology Services Working Group to develop a "strategic
vision" for the Federal Government's use of information technologies.8 9
Similarly, in the face of the Clinton Administration's health care reform
proposals, some analysts have predicted that the 'widespread use' of
telecommunications and information technology applications will reduce
annual health-care costs alone by more than $36 million." 90 The
importance of information is not limited to broadcasters and telephone
companies; it is indeed the "lifeblood" of the global economy.
D. Data Protection and Privacy
The new information policy must take into account growing
international and domestic concern about the negative, intrusive aspect of
communications and information technologies. While in the past the United
States focused on the perceived role of the First Amendment in forbidding
restrictions on information flows, other constitutional and otherwise
significant concerns may argue for restrictions. The American public is
concerned. According to the 1990 Equifax survey by Louis Harris &
Associates and privacy scholar Alan F. Westin, 71% of Americans report
feeling that they have lost control over personal information about them-
selves, and 79% are concerned about threats to personal privacy. 9' The
" CHARLES GOLDFINGER, LA GtOFINANCE 401 (1986) (translated from original in
French).
86 Pete Engardio et al., Global Banker, Bus. WK., May 24, 1993, at 50, 52.
87 AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS:
CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 113 (1993).
88 Id. at 157.
89 Id. at 84.
90 RBOCs Still Anticipate Hatching Information Services 'Golden Egg, supra note 82,
at 1.
9' LoUIs HARRIS & Assocs. & ALAN F. WESTIN, THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON CONSUMERS
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 10 (1993). See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the
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proliferation of digital technologies has sparked growing concern over per-
sonal privacy and heightened interest in data protection and privacy law.
While European countries have afforded significant, detailed, practical
protection to individual privacy rights, particularly in the context of
electronically stored and processed information, the United States affords
virtually none. For example, Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have broad statutes that provide
a general set of privacy rights applicable to both public and private sec-
tors. 92 Soon, under the European Commission's amended proposal for a
Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,93 all
European countries will be required to enact laws protecting personal pri-
vacy and prohibiting the transmission of personal information to countries
perceived as ignoring privacy concerns, such as the United States.94
Under the still-pending directive, every EC member state would have
to enact laws ensuring, among other things, that personal data-defined
broadly by the directive as "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person" 95-must be accurate, relevant, not excessive,
and used only for the legitimate purposes for which it was collected.96
Personal data may be processed-which is defined by the directive as any
operation performed upon the data, whether or not automated97-only with
the consent of the data subject. 98 The collection and processing of data
revealing "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs,
philosophical or ethical persuasion . . . [or] concerning health or sexual
life" is severely restricted. 99 The data subject must be informed and
Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J.
195 (1991).
92 See generally DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETIES (1989).
9 COM(92)422 final SYN 287 (Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Data Processing Directive].
See generally Fred H. Cate, The EC Data Protection Directive and U.S. Business and
Law, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. COMM. COMMITTEE MONOGRAPH SERIES
(forthcoming).
" Data Processing Directive, supra note 93, art. 26 ("Member States shall provide
that the transfer, whether temporary or permanent, to a third country of personal data
which are undergoing processing or which have been collected with a view to processing
may take place only if the third country in questions ensures an adequate level of
protection.").
9' Id. art. 2(a).
96 Id. art. 6.
9' Id. art. 2(b).
98 Id. art. 7(a).
99 Id. art. 8.
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provided with certain mandatory disclosures if data is to be collected,
processed, or distributed to a third party,'0° and he or she must have access
to the data and the opportunity to object to its collection, processing, or
disclosure and to correct any factual errors.'01
The United States and many other countries arguably have no
comparable system of data protection. Although the United States Su-
preme Court in Whalen v. Roe'0 2 claimed to recognize a constitutional
interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, ' ' ° no Court
decision has ever reversed a legislative or administrative action violating
that supposed right. Moreover, such a constitutional right-even if ever
vindicated by a court-would apply only against governmental action.
Federal statutes addressing private actions touching on personal privacy,
although numerous, offer little if any effective protection to indi-
viduals.104
As a result, American businesses with interests in personal data
collected, stored, or processed in Europe, and particularly American
businesses with operations in Europe, fear that they will be unable to move
that data legally-even if they own it-to the United States. U.S. businesses
have good reason to be worried. Already, France, acting under French
domestic law, 0 5 has prohibited the French subsidiary of an Italian parent
company from transferring data to Italy because Italy did not have an
omnibus data protection law. 10 6 The French Commission nationale de
l'informatique et des libert6s has required that identifying information be
'0 Id. arts. 10-12.
'0' Id. arts. 13-15.
102 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'03 Id. at 599.
"4 See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988); Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b) (1988); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b) (1988); Electronic Funds
Transfer Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988);
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009
(1988).
105 Loi No 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative A l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert6
[Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, concerning data processing, records and freedom],
reprinted in A.C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC
353-63 (1990).
"0 D61ib6ration No. 89-78 du 11 juillet 1989, reprinted in Commission nationale de
l'informatique et des libert6s, l0e Rapport 32-34 (1989).
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removed from patient records before they could be transferred to
Belgium, °7 Switzerland,'0 8 and the United States.' 0 9 Similarly, the first
prohibition on transnational data transfer by the British Data Protection
Registrar under national law" 0 forbade a proposed sale of a British mailing
list to a United States direct mail organization."' The threat to U.S.
business is quite real and is only exacerbated by the pending EC Data
Processing Directive's provision requiring European states to enact laws
forbidding the transfer of personal data to countries without adequate legal
data protection. "12
This situation is further complicated for multinational companies by the
diversity of national regulatory structures in place for protecting personal
privacy. For Citicorp, the United States' largest bank and operator of the
Citicorp Global Information Network in ninety-three countries,"' the
variety of legal standards with which the network must comply threatens
the existence of the network and its ability to offer services such as
automated currency conversion. The new information policy must seek to
facilitate a uniform, multinational standard for protecting private infor-
mation. The absence of such a standard will stymie innovative activities
by multinational companies.
E. Economics and Intellectual Property
The fifth and final feature that greatly influences, and must be
addressed by, the new information policy is how the creation, manipula-
tion, and transmission of information is to be financed. At heart, this issue
is largely one of intellectual property, because it is copyright, trademark,
patent, trade secret, and unfair competition laws that create much of the
incentive for creating and using both new information and new technolo-
gies and it is largely through those mechanisms that rights holders are
compensated for these activities.
107 D61ibfration No. 89-98 du 26 septembre 1989, reprinted in Commission nationale
de l'informatique et des libert~s, l0e Rapport d'activit6 35-37 (1990).
108 Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S163 (1992) (citing
interview with Ariane Mole, Attachde Relations internationales, Direction juridique de la
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libert6s, Paris, France (June 6, 1991)).
109 Id.
"0 U.K. Data Protection Act of 1984, reprinted in NUGTER, supra note 105, at 365-95.
... THE DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR, SEVENTH REPORT OF THE DATA PROTECTION
REGISTRAR 33-34 (1991).
112 Data Processing Directive, supra note 93, art. 26.
"' Thomas Hoffman, Citicorp Reaps Net Benefits, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 15, 1993,
at 6.
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U.S. intellectual property law was designed for a world in which
copying was difficult, economically impractical, and relatively easy to
regulate by focusing on the physical manifestation-i.e., the film or
book-and the centralized "copying centers"-i.e., film duplication studios
or reprographic services. Today, when an increasing amount of information
is digital, and the technologies to copy digital and even non-digital
information are far more affordable and widespread in the society, U.S.
intellectual property law is outmoded. Most offices and many homes-with
computers, page scanners, facsimiles, video cassette and video disc
recorders, digital audio cassette recorders, and so forth-are havens for
illegal and uncompensated uses of copyrighted material. And the danger
to creative industries grows with the spread of affordable digital
technologies. The danger is not insignificant. Copyrighted programming of
all forms accounted in 1989 for over $173 billion in revenues and over
$22 billion in exports.114 Compared with imports, exports of U.S. television
programming, films, and music generated a trade surplus of $8 billion
during 1991.15
Given the inherently international characteristics of information
discussed earlier, the domestic focus of U.S. intellectual property law is of
equal concern. For more than a century the United States resisted
participating in any multinational copyright structure. The nation was, in
the words of David Nimmer, an "island, its jurisprudence having evolved
in isolation from developments elsewhere.""' 6 In fact, until 1891, copying
a non-U.S. work was not even a crime in the United States."' Then, in
1952, the United States joined the Universal Copyright Convention
("UCC"),1 8 while refusing to participate in the older, more powerful and
comprehensive 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. 9
In 1988, Congress finally enacted those basic changes necessary for the
United States to accede to the Berne Convention, and the United States
114 Draft Final Text of the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on
Trade, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1992) [hereinafter Uruguay Round] (statement of Eric
H. Smith).
115 Noreene Janus, Hollywood Meets the NAFTA, Bus. MEX., May 1992, at 36.
116 David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An Internation-
al Copyright Proposal for the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 211
(1992).
117 1891 saw passage of the International Copyright Act of 1891, commonly known as
the Chace Act, ch. 565, 26 Stat 1106 (1891).
118 Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 93 U.N.T.S.
178.
119 Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
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joined eighty other countries which were signatories of the Berne
Convention. 20 Much of the impetus for this move came from U.S.
intellectual property owners who desired the broad multinational protection
afforded by membership in Berne. Losses to U.S. copyright holders by
piracy abroad were estimated by the U.S. International Trade Commission
to be $6.2 billion in 1986, up from $1.5 billion only four years earlier, 2'
The twenty-four countries that had ratified Berne but not the UCC and had
no bilateral copyright agreements with the United States were under no
legal obligation to protect the rights of U.S. copyright holders.'2 2 More-
over, U.S. efforts to encourage compliance with international copyright
agreements by countries that provided safe havens to copyright pirates,
such as Thailand, were hindered by the United States' own refusal to join
Berne. 23 In 1988, the U.S. Trade Representatives testified before Congress:
"[I]t is often hard to convince other countries to provide strong copyright
protection when we do not belong to the premier international treaty in the
area of copyright." 24 In short, if the interests of U.S. creative industries
were to be protected, adherence to the global copyright regime reflected
in the Berne Convention was essential.
Those costs, however, will pale by comparison if the United States is
similarly slow to confront the copyright issues posed by digital technology,
massive data bases, high speed data transmission, and undetectable visual
and auditory image manipulation. Professor Paul Goldstein has written
about a "celestial jukebox."'' 25 Rather than owning individual phonore-
cords, compact discs, cassette tapes, video cassettes, or even computer
software, future generations would simply dial up their desired program-
ming from a digital master database. The programming would then be de-
livered by satellite or optical fiber. As a result, rather than the high up-
front cost and ecologically unsound practice of buying individual copies
of media, each user would pay a far smaller per use fee to cover the opera-
120 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1 19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
121 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE 4-6, 4-8 (Feb. 1988).
122 BERNE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-609, 1 00th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988).
123 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 239, 626-27 (1987) (statement of Peter Nolan
of the Motion Picture Association of America).
124 134 CONG. REC. H3082 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (letter of U.S. Trade
Representative Clayton Yeutter included in statement of Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
121 Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the Information Age, STAN. LAW., Fall 1991, at 4, 8.
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tion of the master database and to pay the creators of the requested
programming.
Professor Goldstein's fanciful idea is in many ways near reality today,
but the legal structures for recognizing and compensating authors and
producers lag far behind. Currently, U.S. negotiators are arguing with their
European counterparts about whether to apply "national treatment" or
"reciprocity" in the stalled Trade-Related Intellectual Property in
Services talks. 126 By the time they work that one out, the basic practice
that posed the issue-distinguishing among the nationality of creators in the
payment of royalties-will be moot.
IV. REASSESSING THE PURPOSE AND LIMITS OF POLICYMAKING
A. The Public Interest Standard
Given the importance of the influences on, and features of, the new
information policy identified above-the focus on information, not merely
communications, the inherently global characteristics of information; the
centrality of information to all business and government activities, in-
cluding those of non-traditional communications companies; the impor-
tance of protecting privacy and of assuring accuracy, security, and
reliability; and the need to revise intellectual property law to take account
of digital technologies and multinational issues-policymakers must re-
examine the purpose and the pragmatic and constitutional limits of
policymaking in the information arena.
Congress, the Commission, and courts have interpreted "public
convenience, interest, or necessity" to mean the universal provision of
basic communications services at a minimum price. The phrase "universal
service" was reportedly first coined by Theodore Vail, President of
AT&T, in 1910.127 Universal service is at the heart of Congress' mandate
to the FCC in the Communications Act of 1934.128 In the context of
126 See, e.g., Uruguay Round, supra note 114, at 104 (statement of Eric H. Smith);
International Developments Discussed at Conference, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 20,703
(1992) (quoting U.S. Registrar of Copyrights Ralph Oman:-"We may be seeing the
beginning of the end of Berne as an effective International Treaty ...... ); see also
Intellectual Property and International Issues: Hearings of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991).
127 Kenneth Gordon & John Haring, The Effects of Higher Telephone Prices on
Universal Service, 10 FCC OFF. PLANS & POL'Y WORKING PAPER SERIES, at 2 (Mar.
1984).
128 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). See generally UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note
44 (collecting articles pertaining to the future of universal service in telecommunications).
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broadcast television and radio, universal service has resulted in a system
that provides entertainment and information to the American public
without direct charge. Anyone with a television or a radio can raise an
aerial and bring in, whatever signals there are to receive. Further, the
Commission has identified as its primary criteria in granting broadcast
licenses that every geographic location in the United States have access to
radio and television signals.' 29
In the context of telephone service, universal service is reflected in the
goal of at least one telephone with private line service in every home in
America. 30 The FCC has identified "[t]he preservation of universal
service" as "a basic goal of this Commission." 1 3 ' The primary regula-
tory vehicle for implementing universal service is a federal assistance
program, "Link-Up America," designed to encourage low-income house-
holds, which are not on the telephone network, to subscribe to local
exchange service by reducing initial service and installation charges.'32
Policymakers and regulators must examine the broader range of com-
ponents that "public convenience, interest, or necessity" might include.
For example, the public interest standard might be defined to include
technological innovation. "Public interest" might also be expanded to in-
clude quality programming and service. In the case of programming, while
Congress and the Commission have stressed the importance of every
American having access to "free" over-the-air broadcast television, they
have taken few steps to ensure or even encourage quality and diversity of
programming. "Public interest" might also be defined to include access
to the communications media and the provision of new, innovative ser-
vices-perhaps, for example, pay-per-view television, news and information
services, hand-held telephones, and caller identification and other telephone
services. Each of these potential components of a new definition of
"public interest" raises serious issues: What is the cost of regulation?
Will new services and technologies be made available to the public irre-
spective of ability to pay? If so, who will pay? Is personal privacy com-
promised? Are vital first amendment rights of free expression implicated?
129 Amendment of Section 3.606, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167 (1952) (report and order).
130 March 1986 U.S. Census Bureau data show a national telephone penetration rate
of 92.2%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 561
(113th ed. 1993); see also 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (It is the "duty of every common
carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such
communication service upon reasonable request therefor" and "[a]ll charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication service,
shall be just and reasonable.").
131 MTS and WATS Market Structure, 4 F.C.C.R. 3634, 3634 (1989) (decision and
order).
132 Id. at 3634 & n.1.
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The resolution of these and other issues substantially affects the way
in which "public convenience, interest, or necessity" is defined. In fact,
a frank appraisal of what the public interest standard means in an age of
rapidly advancing technology may lead to the conclusion that the concept
itself is overextended or outmoded.
B. The First Amendment
Information policymakers must also reconsider the constitutionality of
a wide array of regulations in light of changing technology, a new
definition of "public interest," and the First Amendment. Despite its
absolute language-"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press"' 3 -the First Amendment has never
been interpreted to afford absolute protection to communications.134
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the First
Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."'' 35 The Court has stressed the importance of not allowing
government to interfere with that interchange: "The freedom of speech
and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at least the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."'' 36 Often
characterized as a "marketplace of ideas," this central first amendment
tenet requires that "[d]iscussion must be kept open no matter how
certainly true an accepted opinion may seem to be; many of the most
widely acknowledged truths have turned out to be erroneous. 137
Under the First Amendment, government regulations affecting
the content of speech, outside of the broadcast context138 and so-
called "commercial speech,"' 139 are subject to "strict scrutiny" by
133 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.26 (4th ed.
1991).
"' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
136 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381-82 (1984) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)).
137 THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
"3 See infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
131 Until 1976, the Court declined to extend first amendment protection to commercial
speech, which the Supreme Court has vaguely defined as expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of commercial information, in this case information on
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courts. 14 0 As a general principle, the Supreme Court has asserted that
"[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis
of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amend-
ment." 141 Even presenting the public with a diverse selection of
viewpoints, which the Court has also identified as an essential first
amendment principle, 142 cannot be enforced by government regulation
outside of the broadcast context. For example, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a Florida statute that compelled a newspaper to print the response
of a political candidate to an editorial attacking the candidate or endorsing
his or her opponent. 143 Florida had claimed that the "government has an
obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the public."'" The
Court concluded that a right-of-reply statute was "governmental coer-
cion" and contravened "the express provisions of the First Amendment
and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed over the years,"' 45
and that a "[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate."" 1
46
pharmaceutical prices, for intelligent consumer decisionmaking and held that such speech
was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 765. The Court noted, however, that the
"greater objectivity and hardiness" of commercial speech warranted a lesser standard
of protection than for other forms of expression. Id. at 772.
Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court set forth a four-part test for determining
exactly what that standard of protection should be. Under the Central Hudson test: (1) the
commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the
government must assert a substantial interest for its regulation; (3) the regulation must
directly advance that interest; and (4) the regulation must be no more extensive than
necessary to serve the government interest. Id. at 566. In 1989, the Court altered the
fourth prong to require that the regulation merely be "narrowly tailored" to serve the
governmental interest. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
475-81 (1989).
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986), the Court, considering a Puerto Rico law prohibiting local advertising of casino
gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico, reasoned that if the government can constitu-
tionally regulate an activity, it may also regulate speech promoting that activity. Id. at
340-47.
40 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)
("precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest"); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) ("narrowly tailored means of serving
a compelling state interest").
14' Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
142 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
"43 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
'44 Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 254.
146 Id. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
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Of all communications media, only over-the-air broadcasting has been
subject to government regulation of content as "public convenience,
interest, or necessity" may require. 147 That regulation is premised upon the
physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum, which permits the opera-
tion of only a finite number of broadcast stations; in 1943 the Supreme
Court concluded: "Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish
to use the limited facilities of radio .... Because it cannot be used by all,
some who wish to use it must be denied."'
148
The rationale used by the Court has become known as the scarcity
rationale: because there is insufficient electromagnetic spectrum for
everyone to broadcast, the Government may legitimately deny some
people's free expression rights. Twenty-six years later, the Court reiterated
and reaffirmed its scarcity argument in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,149 a case involving a FCC regulation providing that stations
broadcasting programs which attack a -person's character during a
discussion of a controversial issue of public importance must inform the
person and offer him or her an opportunity to rebut the attack. 50 As a
result of electromagnetic scarcity, the Court concluded that the
Government should be permitted to ensure that the public received
"suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences."' 1 Only five years later, the Court would strike down
Florida's effort to enforce a right-of-reply obligation on a newspaper. 5 1 In
Red Lion, however, the Supreme Court applied a lower standard of review
to restrictions on broadcast speech than to restrictions on other forms of
expression. 53 Rather than "strict scrutiny," the Court today generally
requires only that the regulation be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a
''substantial government interest. ' 154
However, the very proliferation of media technologies that argues so
forcefully for a re-examination of the public interest standard may
undermine the scarcity justification for permitting content-based regulation
of broadcast programming. Spectrum scarcity has been widely challenged
14' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, '377 (1969).
148 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (emphasis
added).
149 395 U.S. at 396-400.
150 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a)(3) (1992).
'5' Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
152 Miami Herald Pub. Co., 418 U.S. at 241.
113 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
154 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). The lower,
"substantial government interest" standard is traditionally reserved for content-neutral
regulation such as that of the print media. See id. at 377.
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by Supreme Court Justices, 5 5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,156 the FCC, 157 and many commentators.' 58 Each of these critics
has called for the elimination of the notion that scarcity in the broadcast
spectrum warrants a lower level of constitutional protection for broadcast
expression or justifies a higher level of intrusion into the operation of
America's electronic communications industries.
Scarcity no longer affords a principled justification for treating elec-
tronic and print media differently. The public now has access to a multi-
plicity of new communications outlets, such as cable, video tapes and
disks, satellite receivers, and computer bulletin boards. In the face of
rapidly advancing communications technologies and the varied sources of
information and entertainment programming they make possible, the
Government has little role, if any, in guaranteeing for the public "suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experi-
ences.
'55 See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n. 11; Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 149 (Douglas, J., concurring).
156 See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508
(D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for reh ' en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987); Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 866-67 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is unclear why that
fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way that would be intolerable
if applied to the editorial process of the print media. All economic goods are scarce,
not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go
into the production and dissemination of print journalism. Not everyone who wishes
to publish a newspaper, or even a pamphlet, may do so. Since scarcity is a universal
fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not another.
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 508 (footnote omitted).
157 See, e.g., Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, N.Y., 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order). "[T]he
extraordinary technological advances that have been made in the electronic media since
the 1969 Red Lion decision, together with a consideration of fundamental First
Amendment principles, provide an ample basis for the Supreme Court to reconsider the
premise or approach of its decision in Red Lion." Id. at 5048. The Commission noted the
explosive growth in radio and television since Red Lion was decided in 1969: a 48%
increase in radio stations and 44% increase in television stations. Id. at 5051. In addition,
with the development of UHF television, cable television, and new video delivery
technologies (including low power television, video cassettes, and home satellite dish
antennae) the number of information outlets had increased and the structure of the
industry had become far more competitive than in 1969. Id.
158 See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1981-82); David L. Bazelon, FCC
Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 223.
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Scarcity has little relevance in the tidal wave of information services
and products. Congress and the Commission, subject to oversight by the
courts, must consider what "public interest" might mean today and
whether it should-or, in view of the First Amendment, can-guide the
Government's treatment of information and communications providers.
The challenge for policymakers and regulators, then, is not merely to avoid
propagating endless policy loops and not simply to take into account the
distinctive features of the new information marketplace, although both of
these are important objectives. There must also be a frank assessment of
the impact of these features on the meaning of "public convenience,
interest, or necessity," its relevance, if any, to legislative and regulatory
initiatives, and its constitutionality in light of such dramatic technological,
economic, and political changes.
V. CONCLUSION
Communications policymaking in the United States has increasingly
become an "endless policy loop." Rather than identifying and pursuing
the "public interest," as required by the Communications Act of 1934,
policymakers have instead become enamored with regulating relations
among competing industries-for example, between broadcasters and cable
operators, and cable operators and telephone companies. The cost of this
lack of vision-measured in opportunities and money wasted-is con-
siderable.
U.S. hesitancy to embrace a rational information policy in the face of
advancing technology will pose increasingly higher costs for the Govern-
ment, businesses, and economy of the United States. Furthermore, those
costs will grow exponentially the longer the United States waits to address
the broad array of pressing issues posed by digital technology, massive
data bases, high speed data transmission, and undetectable visual and
auditory image manipulation.
Information policy for the next century is already being greatly
influenced by and must recognize: (1) the importance of information; (2)
its inherently global characteristics; (3) its significance for all business and
government activities; (4) the importance of protecting privacy and of
assuring accuracy, security, and reliability; and (5) the role of intellectual
property law as the engine of the information economy. Each of these
dynamic features presents pressing, vexing issues that must be addressed
by the new information policy. These features also require policymakers
and regulators to re-examine the meaning and application of the
longstanding touchstone of communications policy-public interest-and the
constitutionality of pursuing the public interest standard in a new, more
diverse, global market.
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